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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: COURT OF APPEALS FOR
NINTH CIRCUIT HOLDS STATE INVASION OF PRIVACY
ACTIONABLE UNDER THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
THE Civil Rights Act creates a cause of action1 and affords a federal
forum2 for alleged deprivation, by persons acting under color of
state law or custom, 3 of rights secured by the Constitution'or laws of
the United States. It' is settled that federal claim is created even
though the act violated state law and was not specifically motivated
by the intent to deprive plaintiff of his constitutional rights. 4 A
problem arises, however, in determining the scope and nature of
the rights secured by the Constitution against arbitrary state in-
fringemert. York v. Story,5 a recent case of first impression, gave a
broad scope to the constitutional rights in recognizing a federal Iclaim
under the Civil Rights Act for an arbitrary invasion of privacy by
one acting under color of state law.6
- Rav. STAT. § 1979 (1875),-42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1958). "Every person who, under
color of any statute, ordinance, ,regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or im-
munities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity or other proper proceeding for redress." See generally
Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 Mrcm. L. REv. 1323
(1952) (history); Comment, The Civil Rights Act and Mr. Monroe, 49 CALiF. L. REv.
145 (1961); Note, The Proper Scope of the Civil Rights Acts, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1285
(1953).
2 The jurisdictional basis does not depend on diversity or jurisdictional amount. 28
U.S.C. § 1343 (3) (1958). Reasons for the special jurisdictional basis are set forth by
Mr. Justice Stone in Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 531 (1939). See also Comment,
supra note 1, at 147-63; Comment, Federal Jurisdiction: Amount in Controversy in
Suits for Nonmonetary Remedies, 46 CALIF. L. REv. 601 (1958). Cases are collected in
I BARRON AND HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRAMarCE AND PROCEDURE § 37, at 198-200 (rev. ed.
1960).
3"Under color of" state law has been interpreted to mean purporting to exercise
authority vested by the state, even if the action is unauthorized by state law. Monroe
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961). See also Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91,
110-13 (1945); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S.
496 (1939); Alfange, "Under Color of Law": Classic and Screws Revisited, 47 CORNELL
L.Q. 395 (1962); 1961' Duan L.J. 452. But see Monroe v. Pape, supra at 216-17
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
"Monroe v. Pape, supra note 3, at 184-85. State remedies do not have to be
exhausted before bringing action under the Civil Rights Act. Id. at 183. See also
Abernathy, Expansion of the State Action Concept Under the Fourteenth Amendment,
43 CORNELL L.Q. 375 (1958).
5 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 939 (1964). See 50 VA. L. REV.
174 (1964).
0 To speak of an unqualified right of privacy means little as the tort law of privacy
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In York, the female plaintiff entered the local police station to
file an assault complaint. Defendant police officer, under the guise
of obtaining evidence of the assault, allegedly photographed the
plaintiff in indecent nude positions, despite her objections and asser-
tion that there was no need to take the photographs. The defendant
subsequently advised the plaintiff that the photographs had been
destroyed while in fact they were circulated among police personnel.
Plaintiff complained that defendants, acting under color of state law,
violated the fourth amendment proscription of unreasonable search
and seizure and the guarantee of liberty," both secured against
state action by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.9
Conceding that the defendants acted under color of state law, the
district court dismissed solely on the ground that the plaintiff failed
to state a claim based on rights secured by the Constitution or laws
of the United States.10 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed, holding that the plaintiff stated a claim predicated on the
constitutional right to be free from arbitrary state invasions of
privacy. 1
Although the right of privacy is broad in scope,' 2 it is restricted
in the instant case to freedom from arbitrary interference with one's
personal security. The court held that personal security was pro-
tected from arbitrary state interference by the fundamental substan-
transcends many areas of the law and includes protection against defamation, the
appropriation of one's name or likeness for commercial purposes, and against
intrusion into one's security or seclusion. See generally PRossaR, ToRTs § 97 (2d ed.
1955); Davis, What Do We Mean By "Right to Privacy?" 4 S.D.L. Rlv. 1 (1959); Day &
Berkman, Search and Seizure, and the Exclusionary Rule: A Re-Examination in the
Wake of Mapp v. Ohio, 13 W. Rxs. L. Rav. 56 (1961); Nizer, The Right of Privacy,
39 MICH. L. REv. 526 (1941).
For a full discussion of the right to privacy secured by the Constitution see Nutting,
The Fifth Amendment and Privacy, 18 U. Prrr. L. REv. 533 (1957); Comment, Consti-
tutional Right to Privacy, 40 N.C.L. REv. 788 (1962) (first amendment).
7 "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized." U.S.
CONsT. amend. IV.
8 "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of... liberty... without due process of
law...." U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1.
9It is settled that the specific prohibitions of the fourth amendment are in-
corporated into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and afford the
same protection against the state as against the federal government. Ker v.
California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
10 324 F.2d 450, 454 (9th Cir. 1963).
"Id. at 453-54.
12 See note 6 supra.
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tive rights inherent in the due process clause. It is equally im-
portant, however, to examine the fourth amendment rights as a
standard for determining the constitutional protections afforded
against state action.13 The fourth amendment has been interpreted
primarily in criminal cases, in which it has been invoked to suppress
illegally obtained evidence.14 Thus, while the standard to be fol-
lowed in state criminal cases is clear,' 5 there is no federal precedent
by which to gauge the scope of the fourth amendment rights when
asserted as a basis for an affirmative civil action. The few civil cases
involving the fourth amendment are similar to the numerous crimi-
nal cases in that the amendment was interposed as a defense.' 6
Lack of civil precedent predicating recovery of damages on viola-
tion of rights secured by the fourth amendment results both from
the immunity of federal agents from suit and from the reluctance
of courts to imply a private cause of action based on the express
prohibitions of the Constitution. Federal agents, acting in a minis-
terial capacity, have only qualified immunity, the rationale being
that when authority is exceeded, the person no longer represents the
government. 17 Since the fourth amendment is only a prohibition
'0 See note 9 supra.
"See Beaney, The Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Supreme Court, 1962
Sup. CT. REv. 212. See also Barrett, Personal Rights, Property Rights, and the Fourth
Amendment, 1960 Sup. Cr. REv. 46; Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures, 34
HARV. L. REv. 361 (1921); Grant, Our Common Law Constitution, 40 B.U.L. REv.
1 (1960); Wood, The Scope of the Constitutional Immunity Against Searches and
Seizures, 34 W. VA. L.Q. 1 (1927).
15 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), held that the federal standard of excluding
evidence obtained through illegal search and seizure applied to the states. Mapp
overruled Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), which permitted use of such evidence
in state courts. See, e.g., Reynard, The Right of Privacy, FUNDAMFNTAL LAW IN
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONs 85 (Harding ed. 1959); Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio At Large in
the Fifty States, 1962 DunE L.J. 319.
10 E.g., Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960); Zimmermann v. Wilson, 81 F.2d
847 (3d Cir. 1936) (held fourth amendment applied to tax cases); In re Andrews'
Tax Liability, 18 F. Supp. 804 (D. Md. 1937). See generally DeReuil, Applicability
of the Fourth Amendment in Civil Cases, 1963 Dun L.J. 472; Way, Application of
the Fourth Amendment to Civil Proceedings, 14 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 534 (1959).1 Immunity is based on the necessity of proper functioning of the federal govern-
ment and extends only to the outer perimeter of the line of duty. Ba'rr v. Matteo,
360 U.S. 564, 575 (1959). See also Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593 (1959); Moon v.
Price, 213 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1954); Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949),
cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950); Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers:
Sovereign Immunity, 77 HAxv. L. Rv. 1 (1963); Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and
Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HARv. L. Rlv. 209 (1963); Developments in the Lau-
Remedies Against the United States and Its Officials, 70 HARV. L. Rv. 827 (1957).
The immunity of state officials is not fully recognized in actions under the Civil
Rights Act. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (police); Spires v. Bottoroff, 317
F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1963) (claim for relief recognized against state judge); Scolnick v.
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on government action, there is no constitutional prohibition on un-
reasonable search and seizure by individuals.'8 Moreover, in absence
of statute, the federal courts refuse to imply a private cause of
action to remedy alleged abuses of rights expressly secured by the
Constitution against infringement by the federal government.'0
While dismissing the alleged federal questions, the federal courts
frequently decline to exercise pendant jurisdiction and decide the
collateral questions of state law.20 Thus, as the applicable civil
rights legislation applies only to acts under color of state law,2'
plaintiffs abused by federal authorities have been relegated to state
courts and traditional tort remedies.
Although there is no authoritative precedent for the application
of the fourth amendment in the instant case, the Supreme Court
has considered the substantive protections of the fourth amendment
divorced from the context of the exclusion of evidence. The
amendment was raised as a basis for the alleged unconstitutionality
of ordinances imposing criminal penalties for the refusal to permit
an administrative search, without a warrant, of one's house or prem-
ises.22 In Frank v. Maryland23 the Court explicitly stated that the
Winston, 219 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (action allowed against state attorney
general). See generally 1961 DuKE L.J, 452; 50 VA. L. Rav. 174 (1964).
Is See, e.g., Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921).
"Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963); Bell v. Hood, 71 F, Supp. 813 (S.D.
Cal. 1947). See also Johnson v. Earle, 245 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1957). See generally
The Supreme Court, 1962 Term, 77 HARv. L. Rv. 62, 136 (1963).
20 Bell v. Hood, 71 F. Supp. 813, 820 (S.D. Cal. 1947). See' Note, 62 CoLUM. L. REv.
1018, 1034-41 (1962). But see Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 653 (1963) (Brennan
J.,' lssenting); The Supreme Court, 1962 Term, supra note 19, at 139-40. See generally
Note, Problems of Parallel State and Federal Remedies, 71 HARv. L. Rnv. 513 (1958).
21 The Civil Rights Act does not apply to federal agents. Wheeldin v. Wheeler,
supra note 20. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied,
339 U.S. 949 (1950); Swanson v. Willis, 114 F. Supp. 434 (D.C. Alaska 1953) afj'd,
220 F.2d 440 (9th Cir. 1955). It has been suggested that a federal agent might come
within the Civil Rights Statute, Rav. STAT. § 1980 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1958),
which affords a civil remedy for conspiracy to deprive one of federally secured rights.
Wheeldin v. Wheeler, supra note 20, at 650 n.2. There is no comparable federal statute
creating a civil remedy for deprivation of federally secured rights by persons acting
under color of federal law.
22 Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S.
360 (1959); District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1949), aff'd on other
grounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950). The cases consider the infringement of administrative
searches on the right of privacy secured by the Constitution. Numerous cases recognize
the states' power to protect the health of citizens. E.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
197 U.S. 11 (1904) (compulsory vaccination); United States v. Crescent-Kelvan, 164
F.2d 582 (3d Cir. 1948) (inspection by food and drug authorities); People ex rel.
Barmore v. Robertson, 302 Ill. 422, 134 N.E. 815 (1922) (compulsory quarantine);
Givner v. State,'210 Md. 484, 124 A.2d 764 (1956) (upholding routine inspection of
housing during daylight hours); Nelson v. City of Minneapolis, 112 Minn. 16, 127
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amendment is a guarantor of privacy as well as the right of self
protection. However the fourth amendment was interpreted to
mean considerably less when invoked to protect privacy than when
invoked to exclude illegally obtained evidence.2 4  More explicit sup-
port for the two-fold interpretation can be found in recent dissenting
opinions25 as well as in the classic dissent of Mr. Justice Brandeis
in Olmstead v. United States.2 6 The current interpretation of the
fourth amendment is, however, bound by precedent which devel-
oped through the almost exclusive use of the amendment as a de-
fense in criminal actions, and thus it provides weak support for a
broad constitutional right of privacy.
Thus, to the extent that the fourth amendment has become too
ossified from continual use in criminal actions,27 it is necessary to
pursue the reasoning of the court in the instant case and look to
the guarantee of liberty under the due process clause as the basis
for the constitutional right of privacy. The flexibility of due process
as a substantive provision on which to predicate rights not expressly
N.W. 445 (1910) (compulsory quarantine); Dederick v. Smith, 88 N.H. 63, 184 At.
p95, appeal dismissed, 299 U.S. 506 (1936) (tuberculosis inspector may enter barn
without warrant); Richards v. City of Columbia, 277 S.C. 538, 88 S.E.2d 683 (1955)'
(inspection of substandard dwellings); Reinhart v. State, 193 Tenn. 15, 241 S.W.2d
854 (1951) (routine health inspection). Contra, District of Columbia v. Little, supra.
See generally, VARON, SEARCHES, SEIZURES AND IMMUNITIES 199 (1961); Note, 72
HARv. L. Rlv. 504, 545, 549 (1959).
"359 U.S. 360 (1959).
21At least one commentator suggests that the majority opinion completely denies
the applicability of the fourth amendment beyond protection in criminal cases.
Comment, 44 MINN. L. Rlv. 513, 524 (1960). It is important, however, not to overlook
the fact that Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who wrote the majority opinion in Frank, did
not adhere to the premise that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
incorporates the specific prohibitions of the fourth amendment. E.g., Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 672-86 (1961) (dissenting opinion). Furthermore Frank was decided
prior to Mapp, and thus its reasoning may be subject to reconsideration. 2 VARoN,
op. cit. supra note 22 (Supp. 1962). Compare 28 U. CINc. L. Rav. 478 (1959), and 27
TENN. L. REv. 406 (1960) (critical of Frank), with 26 BROOKLYN L. Rav. 117 (1959),
and 10 NV. REs. L. REv. 304 (1959) (favorable). Frank has been termed "the dubious
pronouncement of a gravely divided court." Ohio ex rel.. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S.
263, 269 (1960) (dissenting opinion).
21 Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 374 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Ohio ex rel
Eaton v. Price, supra note 24 (Brennan J., dissenting). See also District of Columbia
v. Little, 178 F.2d 13, 17 (D.C. Cir. 1949) aff'd on other grounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950).
20 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928). "They [the framers of the Constitution] conferred,
as against the government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable
intrusion by the government upon the privacy of an individual, whatever the means
employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 478.
(Emphasis added.) See also Beaney, supra note 14, at 224-35.
27 See Beaney, supra note 14, at 247-48.
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guaranteed by the Constitution28 is particularly important in this
case to the extent that a court is unwilling to recognize an express
constitutional right of privacy. Due process embodies not just a
series of specific prohibitions on state action but rather freedom
from all substantive inhibitions and purposeless restraints.29  On
this basis recent cases under the Civil Rights Act have held such
substantive prohibitions as assault, battery, and false imprisonment
violative of due process.30 The plaintiff in the instant case sought
relief for a grievance perhaps less tangible but by no means less real
than the infliction of physical restraint or injury.
The tort action for invasion of privacy has enjoyed rapid growth
in the past seventy years.3 1 Many state courts justified recognition
of the right of privacy by equating it to the fundamental rights
secured by the Constitution.32 Although the Supreme Court has
never considered the substantive guarantee of liberty as embodying
the right of privacy, at least one member of the Court has expressed
favor with such a broad interpretation of due process. 3  Liberty
must, of course, be qualified to imply freedom from arbitrary re-
straint, not immunity from reasonable regulations and prohibitions
imposed in the community interest. As reasonableness defies any
objective standard, it is the judicial balancing of interests, follow-
ing a particularistic analysis of the facts, which determines the rea-
sonableness of a search in any given case.84
28E.g., Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 365-66 (1959).
29 Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151, 157 (1931),
Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, 567 (1911). See also Poe v. Ullman,
367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
"1E.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Geach v. Moynahan, 207 F.2d 714
(7th Cir. 1953) (assault); Dye v. Cox, 125 F. Supp. 714 (E.D. Va. 1954) (false arrest
and false imprisonment). See Comment, 49 CALIF. L. REv. 145 (1961); 1961 DuKE L.J.
452; 50 VA. L. Rv. 174, 176-78 (1964).
81 The common law right of privacy developed from the classic article by Warren
and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. Rav. 193 (1890). See authorities
cited note 6 supra.
8" E.g., Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68, 71 (1905);
Welch v. Pritchard, 125 Mont. 517, 241 P.2d 816 (1952). Contra, Prudential Ins. Co.
v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 543 (1922) (dictum). See also McGovern v. Van Riper, 137
N.J. Eq. 24, 33, 43 A.2d 514, 519 (Ch. 1945), aff'd, 137 N.J. Eq. 548, 45 A.2d 842
(Ct. Err. & App. 1946) (held unnecessary to decide question based on the federal
constitution).
"Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 515-22 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Public
Utils. Comm'n v. Pullak, 343 U.S. 451, 467-69 (1952) (Douglas J., dissenting). See
also Silverman v. United States, 275 F.2d 173, 178 (1960) (dissenting opinion), rev'd on
other grounds, 365 U.S. 505 (1961); Douglas, The Bill of Rights Is Not Enough, 38
N.Y.U.L. REv. 207 (1963).
"'See, e.g., United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 63 (1950); Harris v. United
States, 331 U.S. 145, 150 (1947).
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The timing of the judicial determination is important in the
protection of liberty. There is disagreement whether the reasonable-
ness should be determined prior to the search as part of the process
of issuing a warrant or after the fact as an incident to an award of
damages or in a suppression of evidence 5 A warrant provides an
objective standard on which an individual can rely as indicative of
the reasonableness of the requested search as determined by an im-
partial party who has considered the necessity for the intrusion on
individual privacy. Under the Frank decision, however, an un-
defined class of administrative searches are permissable without a
warrant.36 If confronted with an inspection request which borders
on an unreasonable invasion of privacy, a person therefore can only
refuse at the risk of criminal sanctions which will be imposed if the
court fails to agree that the request was unreasonable, 37 and even
the Supreme Court often disagrees on the question of reasonable-
ness. 38 The possibility of abuse of powers resulting from Frank
illustrates the need for a federal civil remedy for the invasion of
privacy.
Although the possibility of recovery from those who abuse au-
thority should provide the incentive necessary to prevent abuses,39
35 A warrant requires judicial consideration of probable cause for the search.
When the requirement is relaxed, the judiciary is bypassed until the question of
reasonableness is raised on trial. Compare Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14
(1948), with Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
359 U.S. 360 (1959).
"7 In State ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 168 Ohio St. 123, 151 N.E.2d 523 (1959), affd
sub. nom. by an equally divided court, 364 U.S. 263 (1960) (per curiam), conviction
was upheld under a health inspection ordinance which carried the penalty of a fine
of not more than $200 or imprisonment of not more than thirty days, or both, and
each day of failure to comply with the search order was a separate violation. The
ordinance did not require probable cause for suspecting that a health hazard existed
within the building.
38 E.g., Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 270-71 (1960); United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
10 Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L.
REv. 493 (1955). The primary incentive for conformance by police to the requirements
of reasonable search and seizure is provided by the exclusion of illegally seized evi-
dence. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 41 (1949)
(dissenting opinions); Traynor, supra note 15, at 322; Waite, Police Regulation by
Rules of Evidence, 42 MIcn. L. REV. 679 (1944).
While criminal prosecution of offending officials may provide incentive, the federal
statute has not been strictly enforced. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2236 (Supp. 1963). See
generally Edwards, Criminal Liability for Unreasonable Search and Seizure, 41 VA. L.
REv. 621 (1955); Kaplan, Search and Seizure: A No Man's Land in the Criminal Law,
49 CALIF. L. REv. 474, 486 (1961); Comment, 47 Nw. U.L. Rlv. 493, 505 (1952); Com-
ment, 58 YALE L.J. 144 (1948).
It has been suggested as an alternative that violations be punished as contempt of
court. Comment, 47 Nw. U.L. REv. 493, 506 (1952).
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it is submitted that requiring a warrant would better remove the
uncertainty surrounding administrative searches by requiring con-
sideration of reasonableness before the search. The administrative
privileges which could be derived from a broad interpretation of
Frank can be compared to the prerevolutionary general writ which
was a factor giving rise to the specific prohibitions of the fourth
amendment.4° A restrictive interpretation of Frank is necessary if
the fourth amendment is to retain any vitality beyond protection for
those accused of a crime.4' Furthermore, divorcing the right of
privacy from the requirement of a warrant and construing it solely
as an element of liberty allows consideration of reasonableness only
after the harm is done. There is little possibility of development of
the concept of liberty to the extent that it is as definite as the fourth
amendment requirement of a warrant.
On the other hand, the guarantee of liberty has the benefit of
being free of the fourth amendment requirement of physical trespass,
a questionable limitation which is recognized in criminal cases.42
The trespass requirement would probably bar recovery for invasion
of privacy under the Civil Rights Act if constitutional objections
were made, for example, to continued state surveillance or shadow-
ing.43 Moreover, the aspect of mental suffering inherent in invasion
of privacy suits4 4 should not bar recovery, as due process embodies
'liberty of the mind as well.as liberty of the body.4r  Due process
embodies the flexibility necessary to protect privacy in our rapidly
changing technological society-flexibility necessary to insure that
police, as well as other government authorities, take action only
pursuant to duly conferred authority.
40 See generally Fraenkel, supra note 14, at 364; Kaplan, supra note 39, at 476;
Comment, 44 MINN. L. REv. 513, 522-23 (1960).
41 See generally Reynard, Freedom From Unreasonable Search and Seizure-A
Second Class Constitutional Right?, 25 IND. L.J. 259, 262-77 (1950) (history of the
fourth amendment); Comment, supra note 40, at 521-23 & nn.29-38.
42 E.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961). When the fourth amend-
ment has been used as a defense in criminal cases the courts have emphasized physical
trespass rather than invasion of privacy. See Traynor, supra note 15, at 333.
""Dean Prosser suggests that many of the cases predicating recovery on invasion
of privacy are primarily concerned with the protection of a mental interest and thus
may be absorbed into the tort of intentional infliction of mental distress as it is
recognized. PROSSER, TORTS § 97 at 639 (2d ed. 1955).
,4 A tort action for invasion of privacy by surveillance or shadowing is recognized
at common law. Schultz v. Frankford Marine, Acc. & Plate Glass Inc. Co., 151 Wis,
537, 139 N.W. 386 (1913). But see Chappell v. Stewart, 82 Md. 323, 33 AtI. 542
(1896), appeal dismissed, 169 U.S. 733 (1898) (declined to enjoin surveillance but
without reference to right of privacy).
45 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (Cardozo, J.).
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